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ESSAYS
THE SECOND CIRCUIT ADDRESSES GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE: A REVIEW OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ACT CASES*
Julie Goldscheidt
INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 2000, the United States Supreme Court decid-
ed the seminal case, United States v. Morrison,' which de-
clared the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women
Act ("XAWA")' unconstitutional.' According to the Court, the
statute, which provided a civil cause of action for victims of
gender-motivated crimes, was beyond the scope of Congress'
power to legislate under both the Commerce Clause and Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 However, Morrison does
not end federal courts' adjudication of gender-motivated
crimes. The Morrison decision did not disturb the vitality of
the federal felonies enacted as part of VAWA,5 which have
©2000 Julie Goldscheid. All Rights Reserved.
Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund; Adjunct
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I would like to thank
Visiting Staff Attorney Mary Davis, former Staff Attorney Lisa Kaufman, legal
interns Dawn Yuster, Elizabeth Saylor, and Sherri Jayson, as well as legal
assistant Taiwaan Harrison for their invaluable assistance in preparing this Essay.
' 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
2 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 was
enacted as Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in scattered sections of 18
and 42 U.S.C.).
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754, 1759.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754, 1759; see also U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 (Com-
merce Clause); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5. Although courts within the Second
Circuit had upheld VAWA's constitutionality, see, e.g., Crisonino v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608,
610 (D. Conn. 1996), the Morrison decision put the constitutional issue to rest.
" 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000) (establishing felony for interstate domestic violence);
18 U.S.C. § 2262 (2000) (establishing felony for interstate violations of protective
orders).
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been the basis for successful prosecutions within the Second
Circuit. Additionally, while the 1994 VAWA civil rights remedy
is no longer good law, efforts are underway to introduce alter-
native federal and state legislation to provide redress for vic-
tims of gender-motivated crimes, while avoiding the constitu-
tional infirmities identified by the Morrison Court. The pre-
Morrison decisions interpreting the civil rights remedy's statu-
tory elements and addressing its procedural applications may
provide the foundation for interpreting those laws.
This Essay reviews VAWA's statutory provisions address-
ing gender-based violence and analyzes the Second Circuit's
application of those provisions. Specifically, it analyzes deci-
sions of district courts within the Second Circuit that integrate
the VAWA policies. This Essay also assesses the Second
Circuit's decisions interpreting the VAWA civil rights remedy
and identifies ways in which those decisions can be used in
future cases in which plaintiffs seek redress for gender-moti-
vated violence.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
In 1994, Congress enacted VAWA as a comprehensive
effort to address the "escalating problem of violence against
women,"6 which was termed "a national tragedy played out
every day in the lives of millions of American women at home,
in the workplace, and on the street."7 Following four years of
legislative deliberations, encompassing nine hearings in which
more than 100 witnesses submitted testimony,' Congress con-
6 S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993).
S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39 (1991).
8 See generally Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family Matter: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judicia-
ry, 103d Cong. (1994); Domestic Violence: Hearing on the Need to Concentrate the
Fight Against an Escalating Blight of Violence Against Women Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993); Violent Crimes Against Women: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993); Violence Against
Women: Fighting the Fear: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. (1993); Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 103d Cong. (1993); Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.
(1992); Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991); Women and Violence: Hearings on
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cluded that crimes of violence motivated by gender have a
"substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce,"9 and that
"bias and discrimination in the criminal justice system often
deprive[] victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender of
equal protection of the laws."1" VAWA represented a multi-
strategic approach to this problem. It included congressional
authorization for $1.6 billion in federal spending over six years
for a range of programs addressing violence against women,
including training for law enforcement officials,11 victim ser-
vices programs, 2 battered women's shelters, 3 rape preven-
tion and education, 4  and a national domestic violence
hotline."5 VAWA also required states to afford full faith and
credit to protective orders issued by other states, 6 and it au-
thorized a range of research projects. 7
Specifically, VAWA established federal felonies for (1) acts
of interstate domestic violence" and (2) interstate violations
of protective orders. 9 VAWA also required courts to order de-
fendants convicted under those statutes to pay full restitution
to the victims for their losses resulting from the crime, which
could include costs incurred for medical services, physical and
occupational therapy, transportation and housing expenses,
lost income, and attorneys' fees.2"
The VAWA civil rights provision was a historic provision
that added to the existing panoply of federal civil rights laws a
cause of action for victims of gender-motivated crimes commit-
ted by private individuals.2' It permitted suits for damages
Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violent Crime Against Women Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990); Domestic Violence:
Terrorism in the Home: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs
and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong.
(1990).
9 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
10 Id.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 13991-94 (2000).
12 See id. § 3796gg(a).
1 See id.
14 See id. § 300w-10.
15 See id. § 10416.
1 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2000).
1 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13961-63 (2000).
, 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000).
" Id. § 2262.
20 Id. § 2264.
21 Prior to the civil rights remedy, federal remedies were available for instanc-
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arising from "crimes of violence motivated by gender."2 2 But
as soon as victims of gender-based violence began to assert
their statutory "right to be free from crimes of violence moti-
vated by gender," defendants began to challenge the law's
constitutionality. 23 After substantial litigation in federal dis-
trict courts, which almost unanimously upheld the law as con-
stitutional,24 the Supreme Court struck down the civil rights
provision as beyond the scope of constitutional federal legislationY
es of gender-based crimes that occurred at work, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; that were committed by state actors, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; and that were committed as part of a conspiracy to deprive someone of
their civil rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2000). But no civil rights law covered the
most common form of gender-motivated violence-that committed by private indi-
viduals.
' The civil rights remedy declared that "[aill persons within the United States
shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender." 42
U.S.C. § 13981(b). A "crime of violence" was defined as an act or acts that would
constitute a felony under existing federal or state law, "whether or not those acts
have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction." Id.
§ 13981(d)(2). A crime was "motivated by gender" if it was "committed because of
gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based
on the victim's gender." Id. § 13981(d)(1). The civil rights remedy permitted recov-
ery of both compensatory and punitive damages and other forms of relief. See id.
§ 13981(c). Although gender-motivated violence disproportionately affects women,
the law was drafted in gender-neutral terms. See id. § 13981.
See generally Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996); Brzonkala v.
Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d
949 (4th Cir. 1997), affd en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), affd sub nom.,
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
24 See generally Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Doe
v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass. 1999), vacated and remanded sub nom.,
Doe v. Walker, 193 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp.
2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98-C-2395, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11010 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999);
Williams v. Bd. of County Comm'r, No. 98-2485-JTM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13532 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1999); C.R.K. v. Martin, No. 96-1431-MLB, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22309 (D. Kan. Oct. 27, 1998); Mattison v. Click Corp., No. 97-CV-
2736, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F.
Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Crisonino v. New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F.
Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996). But
see generally Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc), affd sub nom., Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (striking law as
unconstitutional); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999)
(same).
2 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754, 1759; see also U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 (Com-
merce Clause); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5. In so doing, the Court rejected argu-
ments that the law was a rational response to the formidable evidence before
[Vol. 66: 2
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Nonetheless, federal and state legislators have begun to
respond with alternative statutory formulations. For example,
during the debate over the reauthorization of VAWA's funding
provisions, several members of Congress sought to introduce a
revised civil rights remedy that would retain VAWA's essential
elements but would correct the aspects of VAWA that proved
fatal under the Court's analysis.6 In addition, several states
have introduced analogous legislation that would provide a
parallel remedy in state court for victims of gender-motivated
violence seeking redress for their injuries."
Congress that violence against women substantially affected interstate commerce
and that it was a congruent and proportionate response to persistent bias in the
administration of justice of gender-based crimes. See generally Brief of the United
States, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5 & 99-29),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/search.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2001).
The Court recognized that the civil rights remedy was supported by "numerous
findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on vic-
tims and their families." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. But the Court nonetheless
struck down the law based on its conclusion that upholding the law would "com-
pletely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local authori-
ty." Id. The Court also acknowledged that a "voluminous congressional record"
demonstrated "pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of
gender-motivated violence." Id. at 1755. Nonetheless, the Court deemed the law
beyond Congress' powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
was directed at individuals rather than state actors. Id. at 1758. This Essay will
not focus on the constitutional arguments, but instead it will focus on Second
Circuit decisions under the VAWA felonies and on civil rights remedy decisions
that may have enduring application in other statutory schemes that address gen-
der-motivated violence.
2 Representatives Conyers, Baldwin, and Jackson-Lee attempted to introduce
an amendment to a bill that would reauthorize the spending provisions of VAWA
and would amend the 1994 civil rights remedy by adding a requirement that each
case have a proven nexus with interstate commerce. See Proposed Amendment to
Committee Print of H.R. 1248, 106th Cong. (2000), offered June 27, 2000, to
amend Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, repealed by Mor-
rison, 120 S. Ct. at 1740. The proposed amendment was rejected because it was
not germane to the bill under consideration. See Mark-up in the House Judiciary
Committee (June 27, 2000) (transcript available at House Judiciary Committee and
notes from mark-up on file with author).
" See, e.g., S.R. 1535, 44th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2000); S.R. 7903, 223rd
Leg. (N.Y. 1999); H.R. 4407, 91st Leg. (Ill. 2000). Each of these provisions import-
ed the requirements of the 1994 VAWA civil rights remedy into a cause of action
that could be brought in each particular state's courts. Moreover, several states'
bias crime laws permit civil recovery for gender-based crimes, although those stat-
utes do not track the VAWA civil rights remedy's language. See, e.g., CAL. CIv.
CODE §§ 52(b)(2), 52.1(b) (2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4004 (1999); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/12-7.1(c) (2000); IOWA CODE § 729A.5 (1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 12,
§ 11/ (Law. Co-op. 2000); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 750.147b (Mitchie 1999); MINN.
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Before the Supreme Court decided Morrison, district courts
within the Second Circuit and throughout the country adjudi-
cated VAWA civil rights remedy claims, resulting in decisions
that not only analyzed the remedy's key elements and inter-
preted its procedural implications, but also ruled on the law's
constitutionality.8 While the VAWA civil rights remedy, as
enacted in 1994, is no longer available to victims of gender-
motivated crimes, these VAWA civil rights remedy decisions
may provide a foundation for courts evaluating claims arising
from acts of gender-motivated violence under analogous state-
sponsored statutory formulations.
II. VAWA FEDERAL FELONY PROVISIONS CASES
An eastern district of New York case, United States v.
Hayes," was one of the first prosecutions in the country un-
der the VAWA provision creating a federal felony for interstate
violations of protective orders. 1 In 1992, Patricia Hayes left
her home in Ohio after hostile and aggressive abuse by her
then-husband, Wayne Hayes, which escalated to Mr. Hayes
threatening her with a hammer.32 Ms. Hayes moved to her
parents' home in New Jersey, and she obtained an order of
protection from a New Jersey court." Mr. Hayes then began a
campaign to effect a reconciliation in which he sent her ap-
proximately 600 letters over the next few years, demanding
that she return to him and threatening to kidnap their son and
to injure or kill her if she did not return. 4 In addition, Mr.
Hayes traveled from Ohio to New Jersey, parked outside of Ms.
STAT. § 611A.79 (1999); N.J. STAT. § 2A53A-21 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99D-l(b)
(1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1457 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.083
(West 2000).
28 See supra notes 23 & 24; see also infra Part III.
29 Additionally, VAWA civil rights remedy decisions, although overruled by
Morrison, may provide guidance to courts interpreting what constitutes "gender-
motivation" in other contexts. See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 674
(E.D. Ark. 1998) (citing the Crisonino court's analysis of gender-motivation in as-
sessing whether facts alleged stated claim of hostile work environment sexual ha-
rassment), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 161 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 1998).
30 135 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1998).
31 18 U.S.C. 2262(a)(1) (2000).
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Hayes' residence, and was arrested by New Jersey law en-
forcement for approaching her residence while brandishing a
replica of a gun.35 This incident led Ms. Hayes to obtain a sec-
ond order of protection, but this did not deter Mr. Hayes. He
again traveled from Ohio to New Jersey and was seen near
Ms. Hayes' New Jersey home.36 On December 20, 1995, Mr.
Hayes was arrested by FBI agents37 ; he pled guilty to crossing
state lines to violate orders of protection and was sentenced to
thirty-seven months in custody, with three years of supervised
release." Mr. Hayes appealed the amount of restitution he
was ordered to pay, but each of his claims was rejected. 9
The Hayes case illustrates the importance of this federal
felony statute. Although Ms. Hayes sought assistance from
New Jersey law enforcement, and even though Mr. Hayes was
arrested under state law, he was not deterred from continuing
to stalk Ms. Hayes. Because of federal law enforcement
officials' expertise in prosecuting interstate crime, they were
uniquely capable of addressing this offense. In addition, Hayes
highlights the usefulness of VAWA's restitution provision, as
Mr. Hayes was required to pay the fees that Ms. Hayes in-
curred as a result of his violation of the protective order, in-
cluding housing costs, lost income, and school expenses. °
Moreover, in United States v. Casciano, the Second Circuit
addressed a due process challenge to a conviction under the
VAWA felony provision for interstate violation of a protective
order.4' Casciano involved a woman who had obtained two
protective orders against a man she had briefly dated but who
had begun to harass and threaten her when she attempted to
end the relationship. Mr. Casciano disputed whether the
second protective order had been properly served, but the jury
found that he was guilty.43 Casciano appealed from the judg-
ment against him, arguing that the trial court erred in permit-
as Id.
36 Id.
37 Hayes, 135 F.3d at 135.
28 Id. at 136.
3' Id. at 136-40.
40 Id.
41 124 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1997).
42 She obtained the second order after the first one expired. Id. at 108-09.
4 Id.
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ting the jury, rather than the judge, to decide the validity of
the protective order on which his conviction was based." Per-
haps reflecting the Second Circuit's concern that it interpret
the statute in accordance with the statute's legislative history,
the court requested an amicus brief from NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund, which was involved in the law's enact-
ment.45 The Second Circuit reasoned that it was unlikely that
Congress intended federal juries to interpret the intricacies of
the protective orders of fifty states, and it concluded that the
issue "is at most an issue for the judge to resolve. ' G The court
rejected Casciano's remaining claim that he was denied due
process because service was imperfectly effected, and his other
objections to the jury charges and the application of the sen-
tencing guidelines.47
Additionally, in United States v. Von Foelkel,48 the Second
Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the VAWA interstate
domestic violence felony. Mr. Von Foelkel was convicted under
VAWA after he stalked and harassed his former wife, even
after she had changed her and her son's identities and moved
to another state.49 The court upheld the conviction and ruled
that the statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress' au-
thority under its Commerce Clause power to regulate the chan-
nels of interstate commerce.5" In so doing, the Second Circuit
agreed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit's earlier decision in United States v. Wright,5 which
deemed the statute constitutional under similar reasoning. 2
Lastly, United States v. Gluzman5 ' generated substantial
news coverage because the case involved the prosecution of a
woman under VAWA's felony provision. Ms. Gluzman was con-
victed of murder and conspiracy to commit murder in the
" Id. at 110-11.
'5 See Letter from Second Circuit Court of Appeals to, among others, Martha
Davis, Legal Director, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund (July 10, 1997)
(on file with author).
" Casciano, 124 F.3d at 111.
17 Id. at 113-15.
41 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
Id. at 341.
5' See id.
51 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997).
52 See Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d. at 341.
13 154 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 66: 2
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death of her estranged husband.54 This homicide was covered
by the VAWA interstate domestic violence felony provision be-
cause Ms. Gluzman conspired to commit murder in New Jersey
and later crossed the state border into New York, where she
took part in the homicide.55 Ms. Gluzman and a co-conspirator
entered Mr. Gluzman's apartment while he was out of the
house.56 Upon his arrival, they murdered him with axes and
dismembered his body with the intent of hiding their crime. 7
The next day, a police officer discovered Ms. Gluzman's co-
conspirator attempting to dump plastic bags containing Mr.
Gluzman's remains into the Passaic River, which led to the ar-
rest and ultimate conviction of both co-conspirators."
The Second Circuit quickly dismissed Ms. Gluzman's con-
stitutional challenge to the VAWA interstate domestic violence
felony provision.59 The court relied on its decision in Von
Foelkel, which upheld the VAWA interstate violation of a pro-
tection order felony, and it saw no reason to treat the two
VAWA felonies differently." In reaching that result, the Sec-
ond Circuit joined the other federal courts that have addressed
this issue, which unanimously have upheld the constitutional-
ity of both VAWA felonies as falling well within Congress'
commerce clause power.6' The Second Circuit also rejected
Ms. Gluzman's remaining challenges, which included allega-
tions of improprieties in the jury selection system and claims
of prejudicial error.62




G Oluzman, 154 F.3d at 50.
9 Id.
0 Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 572 (5th Cir. 1999) (18
U.S.C. § 2261) cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1984 (2000); United States v. Page, 167
F.3d 325, 334 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (same) cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 496 (1999);
United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 766 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v.
Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1997) (18 U.S.C. § 2262).
" Gluzman, 154 F.3d at 50-51.
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III. VAWA CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY CASES
Although the Second Circuit did not adjudicate any claim
under the VAWA civil rights provision, district courts within
the Second Circuit produced groundbreaking rulings that up-
held the law's constitutionality," which were widely cited un-
til the Morrison Court found the statute unconstitutional.
However, in addition to addressing the constitutionality of the
civil rights remedy, these courts interpreted the key elements
of a VAWA civil rights claim and evaluated procedural ques-
tions that arise from adjudications of such claims. Those rul-
ings may have enduring use for courts interpreting analogous
laws that provide remedies for gender-based crimes.
For example, two cases analyzed the VAWA civil rights
remedy's statutory element requiring proof of "gender motiva-
tion."' First, in Crisonino v. New York City Housing Authori-
'6 For example, a Connecticut district court was the first court in the country
to rule on, and uphold, the civil rights remedy's constitutionality. See Doe v. Doe,
929 F. Supp. 608, 617 (D. Conn. 1996). Courts in every federal circuit, except the
11th and the D.C. Circuits, cited Doe as support for the VAWA civil rights
remedy's constitutionality. See, e.g., Bailey, 112 F.3d at 765; Brzonkala v. Va.
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 917 (4th Cir. 1999) (Motz, J., dis-
senting); Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 968 (4th
Cir. 1997); Burgess v. Cahall, 88 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (D. Del. 2000); Jugmohan
v. Zola, No. 98 Civ. 1509 (DAB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1910, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 24, 2000); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628, 631 n.6 (M.D. La.
1999); Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701, 710 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Dill v.
Oslick, No. 97-6753, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10746, at *25 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1999);
Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64, 66 (D. Mass. 1999); Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp.
2d 452, 476 (D.R.I. 1999); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98-C-2395, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11010, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1999); Williams v. Bd. of County Comm'r, No. 98-
2485-JTM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13532, at *9 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1999); C.R.K. v.
Martin, No. 96-1431-MLB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22309, at *9 (D. Kan. Oct. 27,
1998); Mattison v. Click Corp., No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720, at *20
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1998); McCann v. Rosquist, 998 F. Supp. 1246, 1247 (D. Utah
1998); Timm v. Delong, 59 F. Supp. 2d 944, 958 (D. Neb. 1998); Ziegler v. Ziegler,
28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 609 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Crisonino v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp.
1188, 1193-94 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D.
Ill. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1380 n.1, 1409-10 (N.D. Iowa 1997);
United States v. Wright, 965 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 n.4 (D. Neb. 1997). The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York was the first court to
address the law's constitutionality after the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found
the law unconstitutional in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State
University. Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
64 For an in-depth analysis of the proper interpretation of the "gender-motiva-
tion" element, see generally Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Develop-
[Vol. 66: 2
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ty,6" the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York considered a claim that a woman's supervisor
called her a "dumb bitch" and then "shoved her to the
ground."66 The court adhered to Congress' directive to follow
the factual analysis for race or sex discrimination under other
civil rights laws such as Title VII, and it recognized that the
determination of whether a particular act is gender-motivated
will be based on the "totality of the circumstances."67 Ulti-
mately, the court found the evidence sufficient to permit a jury
to determine that the acts were gender-motivated." Indeed,
numerous courts have cited Crisonino when analyzing whether
VAWA civil rights remedy cases sufficiently alleged gender-
motivation. 9
For example, in Jugmohan v. Zola,7" the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York found the
defendant's conduct to be gender-motivated. The defendant, a
male cardiologist at a hospital, approached a female nurse,
who was a stranger to him, made sexual comments about the
size of her breasts, forcibly rubbed her stomach, and grabbed
her breasts.71 After she pushed him away and attempted to
escape, he followed her into an elevator where he subjected her
to additional unwanted sexual advances.72 As soon as the ele-
vator opened, she escaped and reported the assault.73 The re-
cord revealed that the doctor had an "extensive history" of
conduct that was humiliating, abusive, or sexually degrading
ing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARv. WOMEN's L. J.
123 (1999).
" 985 F. Supp. 385, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
'G Id. at 389.
' Id. at 391.
68 Id.
" See, e.g., Jugmohan v. Zola, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1910, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 24, 2000); Harris v. Franklin-Williamson Human Servs., 97 F. Supp. 2d 892,
906 (S.D. Ill. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000);
Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Wesley v. Don Stein
Buick, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1205 (D. Kan. 1999); Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4
F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1361 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98-C-2395, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11010, at *14 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1999); Wilson v. Diocese of New
York of the Episcopal Church, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2051, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
23, 1998); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 605 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
70 No. 98 Civ. 1509, 2000 Dist. LEXIS 1910 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2000).
71 Id. at *1-3.
72 Id. at *3.
73 Id. at *3.
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toward women.74 Relying on Crisonino and similar cases from
other circuits that recognize such circumstantial evidence as
reflecting gender-motivation, the Jugmohan court concluded
that the allegations of the defendant's sexually degrading com-
ments, unwanted sexual conduct, and pattern of unwanted
sexual advances toward women sufficiently pled a claim of
"gender motivation" under the law.75
Moreover, Peddle v. Sawyer,76 a Connecticut district court
case, was one of a few cases in the country to address the ques-
tion of whether institutions could be held liable under the
VAWA civil rights remedy for conduct committed by an
employee.77 In Peddle, the court analyzed a claim against the
federal correctional institution in Danbury, Connecticut, based
on an officer's repeated unwanted sexual assaults on one of the
female inmates.7" The court reasoned that supervisory liabili-
ty should apply in VAWA civil rights cases because the law
was analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which standards for
supervisory liability have been defined.79 The court imported
the standard for assessing supervisory liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and held that supervisors could be liable if:
(1) the defendant directly participated in the alleged infraction; or
(2) the defendant, while acting in a supervisory capacity, either (a)
failed to remedy the alleged wrong after learning of the violation, (b)
created a policy or custom under which the unconstitutional practic-
es occurred or allowed such policy or custom to continue; or (c) was
grossly negligent or displayed deliberate indifference to the
plaintiffs rights in managing subordinates who actually caused the
constitutional violation.80
Applying this standard, the court upheld the claim of su-
pervisory liability, finding that the Danbury prison officials
created a policy or custom of tolerating prisoners' rights viola-
tions by continuing to employ the guard, despite their knowl-
4 Id. at *4-5.
7 See Jugmohan, No. 98 Civ. 1509, 2000 Dist. LEXIS 1910 at *9-11.
76 64 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D. Conn. 1999).
77 Id. at 17-19.
78 Id. at 14-15.
79 Id. at 14. The court referenced VAWA's legislative history, which recognizes
that the VAWA civil rights remedy was " 'a civil rights remedy in the tradition of
Sections 1981, 1983 and 1985(3).' " Id. at 18 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41
(1990)).
"0 64 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
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edge of his "sexual misconduct.""l The few other courts in the
country that have addressed this question have employed simi-
lar reasoning to conclude that institutions might be liable for
VAWA civil rights violations under supervisory liability theo-
ries.82
A southern district of New York case, Ericson v. Syracuse
University," was the first case in the country to address a
procedural issue with significant practical importance to plain-
tiffs-the appropriate statute of limitations for VAWA civil
rights remedy claims." In Ericson, two former college stu-
dents alleged that their former tennis coach sexually harassed
them over a period of approximately three years. 5 Among
other claims, the women alleged that the school's inadequate
response to their complaints violated Title IX and that the
coach violated the VAWA civil rights provision.8" The court
first addressed the defendant's challenge that the VAWA claim
was time-barred. It rejected the challenge and ruled that the
applicable statute of limitations for VAWA civil rights remedy
claims was three years, applying the limitations period of New
York State's personal injury law. 8 The court borrowed the
analysis used in civil rights cases, such as those brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and it applied the statute of limitations for
the state law it deemed most analogous, which it determined,
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., Grace v. Nissan, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1089 (D. Or. 1999) (rejecting
institutional liability under respondeat superior theory but determining that such a
claim could survive upon a showing that the perpetrator had final policymaking
authority, that the policymaker ratified a subordinate's conduct, or that the
policymaker acted with deliberate indifference to that conduct, a showing that was
not made under the facts of the case); accord Chase v. Genesis Consol. Servs.,
Inc., 1999 WL 1327395, at *6 (D.N.H. 1999) (following Grace but rejecting claims
as insufficient); cf. Dill v. Oslick, No. 97-6756, 1999 WL 508675, at *10 (E.D. Pa.
July 19, 1999) (assuming arguendo that institutional actors could be liable for
aiding or encouraging employee's conduct but rejecting claim on facts presented).
' 35 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (adjudicating, inter alia, Title IX
and VAWA civil rights remedy's statute of limitations)
" Id. at 329-30.
82 See id. at 327; see also Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (adjudicating constitutionality of VAWA civil rights remedy).
8" The court held that the complaint stated a cognizable Title IX claim based
on the allegations that school officials had actual notice that the coach had been
harassing female student-athletes for twenty years and that school officials con-




without much analysis, to be New York State's personal injury
law.
89
However, the Ericson approach was rejected by an Oregon
district court because it failed to address the federal "catch-all"
statute of limitations applicable to all federal laws enacted
after 1990 that do not explicitly identify a limitations period. 0
Under that federal "catch-all," a four-year limitations period
should apply to VAWA civil rights remedy claims.91 The fail-
ure of the Ericson and Wesley courts to apply the federal
"catch-all" statute of limitations likely reflects a lack of famil-
iarity with the statute because neither decision addressed the
applicability of this provision. Resolution of this issue can be
critical to victims of gender-based violence who may not have
brought claims within the short statutes of limitations typical-
ly applicable to intentional torts.92
"' Id. at 330. Other courts adopted similar reasoning and applied analogous
state statutes of limitations to VAWA civil rights remedy claims. See Arnold v.
County of Nassau, 89 F. Supp. 2d 285, 308 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (following Ericson
in assuming that a three-year state statute applies); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick,
Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1197 (D. Kan. 1999) (applying two-year statute of limi-
tations for state personal injury claim); Mackensie v. Smith, No. 98-5419, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 14119, at *5 (6th Cir. June 23, 1999) (assuming one-year state
statute of limitations for state personal injury claims would apply); Santiago v.
Alonso, 66 F. Supp. 2d 269, 271 (D.P.R. 1999) (assuming one-year state statute of
limitations for civil negligence or fault would apply).
90 See Grace v. Nissan, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (D. Or. 1999) (applying
four-year statute of limitations under required under the federal catch-all, 28
U.S.C. § 1658); accord DAVID FRAZEE ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN LAW AND
LITIGATION § 11:22 (1998) (explaining that four-year "catch-all" statute of limita-
tions applies); Lisa Barre-Quick & Shannon Matthew Kasley, The Road Less Trav-
eled: Obstacles in the Path of the Effective Use of the Civil Rights Provision of the
Violence Against Women Act in the Employment Context, 8 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 415, 431 & n.61 (1998) (same); Betty Levinson, The Civil Rights Remedy of
the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy Implications & Litiga-
tion Strategy, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 401, 407 n.41 (1996) (same).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000).
The statute of limitations for battery and assault typically is two or three
years. See generally LEONARD KARP AND CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAI-
LY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT, AND SEXUAL ABUSE App. B., 1999 Supp. § 1.31. The short
limitations period seriously curtails the ability of domestic violence victims to, for
example, sue for personal injury. See Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic
Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 357
(1997).
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CONCLUSION
Congress' enactment of the 1994 Violence Against Women
Act turned federal attention to the problem of gender-based
violence, which has taken an enormous toll on our nation. The
federal felonies enacted as part of VAWA have provided an
important complement to state law enforcement efforts to more
effectively combat crimes such as domestic violence, sexual
assault, and stalking. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals'
decisions have advanced the case law interpreting those felony
statutes. In addition, decisions from district courts within the
Second Circuit, in cases brought under VAWA's civil rights
remedy, have made important contributions by analyzing
VAWA's statutory elements and evaluating its procedural
questions. Those decisions may have enduring value as new
remedies to provide redress to victims of gender-motivated
crime develop and as we continue to advance our national
commitment to full equality and safety for all.

